This paper attempts define reputational risk in financial intermediation and to identify the proximate sources of reputational risk facing financial services firms. It then considers the key drivers of reputational risk in the presence of transactions costs and imperfect information in financial markets, surveys empirical research in the literature on the impact of reputational losses imposed on financial intermediaries, and presents some new empirical findings. The paper then develops the link between reputational risk and exploitation of conflicts of interest in financial intermediation, arguably one of the most important threats to the reputational capital of financial firms. Finally, it considers some managerial requisites for dealing with both reputational risk and conflicts of interest.
Financial services comprise an array of "special" businesses. They are special because they deal mainly with other people's money, and because problems that arise in financial intermediation can trigger serious external costs.
In recent years the role of various types of financial intermediaries has evolved dramatically. Capital markets and institutional asset managers have taken intermediation share from banks. Insurance activities conducted in the capital markets compete with classic reinsurance functions. Fiduciary activities for institutional and retail clients are conducted by banks, broker-dealers, life insurers and independent fund management companies. Intermediaries in each cohort compete as vigorously with their traditional rivals as with players in other cohorts, competition that has been intensified by deregulation and rapid innovation in financial products and processes. Market developments have periodically overtaken regulatory capabilities intended to promote stability and fairness as well as efficiency and innovation.
It is unsurprising that these conditions would give rise to significant reputational risk exposure for the financial firms involved. For their part, investors in banks and other financial intermediaries are sensitive to the going-concern value of the firms they own, and hence to the governance processes that are supposed to work in their interests. Regulators in turn are sensitive to the safety, soundness and integrity of the financial system, and from time to time will recalibrate the rules of the game. Market discipline, operating through the governance process, interacts with the regulatory process in ways that involve both costs and benefits to market participants and are reflected in the value of their business franchises. Section 1 of this paper defines reputational risk and outlines the sources of reputational risk facing financial services firms. Section 2 considers the key sources of reputational risk in the presence of transactions costs and imperfect information.
1 Section 3 surveys available empirical research on the impact of reputational losses imposed on financial intermediaries, including the separation of reputational losses from accounting losses. Section 4 builds a link between exploitation of conflicts of interest and reputational risk. Section 5 considers managerial requisites for dealing with both reputational risk and conflicts of interest. Section 6 concludes.
What is Reputational Risk?
Reputational risk in banking and financial services is associated with the possibility of loss in the going-concern value of the financial intermediary -the risk-adjusted value of expected future earnings. Reputational losses may be reflected in reduced operating revenues as clients and trading counterparties shift to competitors, increased compliance and other costs required to deal with the reputational problem -including opportunity costs -an increased firmspecific risk perceived by the market. Reputational risk is often linked to operational risk, although there are important distinctions between the two.
According to Basle II, operational risks are associated with people (internal fraud;
clients, products and business practices, employment practices and workplace safety), internal processes and systems, and external events (external fraud, damage or loss of assets, and force majeure). Operational risk is specifically not considered to include strategic and business risk, credit risk, market risk or systemic risk, or reputational risk. 2 If reputational risk is bracketed-out of operational risk from a regulatory perspective, then what is it? A possible working definition is as follows:
Reputational risk comprises the risk of loss in the value of a firm's business franchise that extends beyond event-related accounting losses and is reflected in a decline in its share performance metrics. Reputation-related losses reflect reduced expected revenues and/or higher financing and contracting costs. Reputational risk in turn is related to the strategic positioning and execution of the firm, conflicts of interest exploitation, individual professional conduct, compliance and incentive systems, leadership and the prevailing corporate culture. Reputational risk is usually the consequence of management processes rather than discrete events, and therefore requires risk control approaches that differ materially from operational risk.
According to this definition, a reputation-sensitive event might occur which triggers an identifiable monetary decline in the market value of the firm. After subtracting from this market capitalization loss the present value of direct and allocated costs such as fines and penalties and settlements under civil litigation, the balance can be ascribed to the impact on the firm's reputation. Firms that promote themselves as reputational standard-setters will, accordingly, tend to suffer larger reputational losses that firms that have taken a lower profile -that is, reputational losses associated with identical events according to this definition may be highly idiosyncratic to the individual firm.
In terms of the overall hierarchy of risks faced by financial intermediaries, reputational risk is perhaps the most intractable. In terms of Exhibit 1, market risk is usually considered the most tractable, with adequate time-series and crosssectional data availability, appropriate metrics to assess volatility and correlations, and the ability to apply techniques such as value at risk (VaR) and risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Credit risk is arguably less tractable,
given that many credits are on the books of financial intermediaries at historical values. The analysis of credit events in a portfolio context falls short of market risk, although many types of credits have over the years become "marketized" through securitization structures such as asset-backed securities (ABS) and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) as well as derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS). These are priced in both primary and secondary markets, and transfer some of the granularity and tractability found in market risk to the credit domain. Liquidity risk, on the other hand, has both pluses and minuses in terms of tractability -in continuous markets liquidity risk can be calibrated in terms of bid-offer spreads, although in times of severe market stress and flights to quality liquidity can disappear. The other point brought out in Exhibit 1 relates to the linkages between the various risk-domains. Even the most straightforward of these -such as between market risk and credit risk -are not easy to model or to value, particularly in a bidirectional form. There are 36 such linkages, exhibiting a broad range of tractability. We would contend that the linkages which relate to reputational risk are among the most difficult to assess and to manage.
Sources of Reputational Risk
Where does reputational risk in financial intermediation originate? We argue that is emanates in large part from the intersection between the financial firm and the competitive environment, on the one hand, and the direct and indirect network of controls and behavioral expectations within which the firm operates on the other, as depicted generically in Exhibit 2. 3 The franchise value of a financial institution as a going concern is calibrated against these two sets of benchmarks. is difficult to take the side of an offending financial firm.
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In the United States, for example, tighter regulation and closer surveillance, aggressive prosecution and plaintiff litigation, unsympathetic media and juries, and stricter guidelines for penalties and sentencing make it easier to get into trouble and harder to avoid serious penalties. Global brokerage and trading operations, for example, involve hundreds of different, complex and constantly changing products that are difficult to monitor carefully under the best of circumstances. Doing this in a highly competitive market, where profit margins are under constant challenge and there is considerable temptation to break the rules, is even more challenging. Performance-driven managers, through compensation and promotion practices, have sometimes unwittingly encouraged behavior that has inflicted major reputational damage on their firms and brought some of them down.
The reality is that the value of financial intermediaries suffers from such 4 For a discussion, see Capiello (2006) . 5 For a full examination of these issues, see Smith & Walter (1997) .
uncertain reputation-sensitive conditions. Since maximizing the value of the firm is supposed to be the ultimate role of management, its job to learn how to run the firm so that it optimizes the long-term trade-offs between profits and external control. It does no good to plead unfair treatment -the task is for management to learn to live with it, and to make the most of the variables it can control.
The overall process can be depicted in a graphic such as Exhibit 3, representing the firm and its internal governance processes in the center and various layers of external controls affecting both the firm's conduct and the reputational consequences of misconduct, ranging from "hard" compliance components near the center to "soft" but potentially vital issues of "appropriate" conduct in the periphery. Clearly, serious reputational losses can impact a financial firm even if it is fully in compliance with regulatory constraints and its actions are entirely legal. The risk of reputational damage incurred in these outer fringes of the web of social control are among the most difficult to assess and to manage. Nor is the constraint system necessarily consistent, with important differences in regulatory regimes (as well as expectations regarding responsible conduct) across markets in which a firm is active -so that conduct which is considered acceptable in one environment may give rise or significant reputational risk in another.
Valuing Reputation Risk
Recent research has attempted to quantify the impact of reputation risk on share prices during the 1980s and 1990s. 6 Given the nature of the problem, most of the evidence has been anecdotal, although a number of event studies have been undertaken in cases where the reputation-sensitive event was "clean" in terms of the release of the relevant information to the market. For one of the early studies, see Smith (1992) .
7 Walter and DeLong (1995) 8 For a journalistic account, see The Wall Street Journal (1994) and Euromoney (1994). Banesto's problems stemmed from rapid growth and a convoluted structure of industrial holdings followed by a serious downturn in the Spanish Instead, the Bank of Spain took control of Banesto on the following day, December 28, 1993. Citing mismanagement and reckless lending, the Governor justified the action in order to avoid a run on the deposits of the bank, whose share prices were falling sharply on the Madrid Exchange. Given Morgan's multifaceted involvement in Banesto and potential conflicts imbedded in that relationship, the announcement of the takeover could have had a large effect on the value of Morgan's reputation and business franchise and hence its stock price.
In order to test the impact of the Banesto case on the JP Morgan share price, we use conventional event study methodology. 9 We create a sample 9 De Long & Walter (1994) . For event study methodology, see Brown and Warner (1985 In a pilot study of 49 reputation-sensitive events, using the aforementioned definition and excluding operational events, we find negative mean CARs of up to 7% and $3.5 billion, depending on the event windows used. Exhibit 9 shows the results graphically and the tables in Exhibits 10 and 11 show the numerical results. We do not, however, distinguish between the associated monetary losses and the pure reputational losses.
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The only study so far which attempts to identify pure reputational losses is Exhibit 12 -note that the reputational losses (66%) are far larger than the cost of fines (3%), class action settlements (6%) and accounting writeoffs (25%)
resulting from the events in question.
Reputational Risk and Conflicts of interest
One of the key sources of reputational risk in the financial services sector is the exploitation of conflicts of interest. Potential conflicts of interest are a fact of life in the financial services industry, and always will be. The question is whether they are exploited, and thereby impose agency costs on others. In All of these represent exploitation of Type-1 conflicts, which set the firm's own interest against those of its clients in wholesale, interprofessional transactions. Type-2 conflicts dealing with differences in the interests of multiple wholesale clients center predominantly on two issues: (1) A financial intermediary may obtain private information about a client, which in turn may be used in ways that harm the interests of that client; or (2) A financial firm may have a relationship with two or more clients who are themselves in conflict.
Conflicts of interest in retail financial markets are depicted in Exhibit 14. Strahan (1999) , Saunders (1985) and Schotland (1980) .
All such conflicts appear to be Type 1 conflicts, which set the interests of the financial intermediary itself against the interests of its clients. They include biased client advice based on a "salesman's stake" in promoting high-margin "house" products over lower-margin third-party products, based on incentives that are rarely transparent to the retail client. Or retail clients may be pressured to acquire additional financial services on unfavorable terms in order to access a particular product, such as the purchase of credit insurance tied to consumer or mortgage loans. Or a financial firm that is managing assets for clients may exploit its agency relationship by engaging in excessive trading which creates higher costs.
Or clients may be encouraged to leverage their investment positions through margin loans from the firm, exposing them to potentially unsuitable levels of market risk and high credit costs. Or there may be misuse of personal information by a firm under intense pressure to cross-sell.
Conflicts of interest exploitation may also transition the wholesale and retail domains, as depicted in Exhibit 15
This can involve either Type-1 or Type-2 conflicts, and sometimes both at the same time. One example is the classic conflict between a firm's "promotional role" in raising capital for clients in the financial markets and its obligation to provide suitable investments for retail clients. 15 Or a financial firm that is acting as an underwriter or has or acquired securities in a secondary market trade may be unable to resell them at an acceptable price and may seek to cut its exposure to loss by allocating unwanted securities to investment accounts over which it has discretion. Or analysts working for sell-side firms in diverse and fundamentally incompatible roles may encounter intractable conflicts in taking views on listed equities. Or a bank with credit exposure to a client whose bankruptcy risk has increased (to the private knowledge of the banker) may have an incentive to assist the corporation in issuing bonds or equities to the general public, with the proceeds used to pay-down the bank's loans.
Aside from this basic taxonomy of conflict of interest exploitation, we posit that the broader the range of a financial intermediary's activities, (1) the greater the likelihood that the firm will encounter exploitable conflicts of interest, (2) the higher will be the potential agency costs facing its clients, and (3) the more difficult and costly will be the safeguards necessary to prevent conflict of interest exploitation. If this proposition is correct, agency costs associated with conflicts of interest can easily offset the realization of economies of scope in financial services firms -scope economies that are supposed to generate benefits on the demand side through cross-selling (revenue synergies) and on the supply side through more efficient use of the firm's business infrastructure (cost synergies).
As a result of conflict exploitation the firm may win and clients may lose in the first instance, but subsequent adverse reputational and regulatory consequences 
Controlling Conflicts of Interest
Mechanisms to control conflicts of interest are based on either regulation, civil litigation or market discipline -often a combination. These external controls, in turn, form the basis for a set of internal controls, which can be either prohibitive or affirmative, involving in the first instance the behavioral "tone" and incentives set by boards and senior management together with reliance on the loyalty and professional conduct of employees. They are fundamentally matters of sound corporate governance.
Regulatory control of conflicts of interest tends to be applied through both SROs and public agencies, and is generally anchored in banking, insurance, securities and consumer protection legislation that is supposed to govern market Second, even in the absence of regulatory constraints -actions that are widely considered to be "unfair," "unethical" or otherwise contrary to the external constraint system discussed earlier -will tend to be subject to market discipline through its reputational impacts. In a competitive context, this will affect firm valuation through the revenue and risk dimensions identified in Exhibit 4, in particular. That is, even in the absence of regulatory constraints, management ought to be aware that efforts to avoid conflict of interest exploitation and other sources of reputational damage is likely to reinforce the value of the firm as a going concern and, with properly structured incentives, their own rewards. Since they tend to be more granular and applied in a real-time context, market discipline constraints can reach the more opaque risks to reputational capital, including conflict of interest exploitation. It can identify such issues as they occur in real time, which external regulation normally cannot do.
Third, since market-conduct regulation tends to be linked to be information asymmetries and transactions costs, optimum regulation should be carefully tailored to market domain -notably the wholesale and retail domains. Often this is not possible, resulting in overregulation in some areas and underregulation in others. Market discipline-based constraints can help alleviate this problem by permitting lower overall levels of regulation. Particularly in the case of conflicts of interest that bridge the wholesale and retail domains, market discipline can be effective in dealing with faultlines across financial market segments. And, just as market discipline can reinforce the effectiveness of regulation, it can also can serve as a precursor of sensible regulatory change.
Fourth, market structure and competition across strategic groups can help determine the effectiveness of market discipline. For example, inside information accessible to a bank as lender to a target firm would almost certainly preclude its affiliated investment banking unit from acting as an adviser to a potential acquirer. An entrepreneur may not want his or her private banking affairs handled by a bank that also controls his or her business financing. A broker may be encouraged by a firm's compensation arrangements to sell in-house mutual funds or externally-managed funds with high fees under "revenue-sharing" arrangements, as opposed to funds that would better suit the client's needs. Market discipline that helps avoid exploitation of such conflicts of interest may be limited if most of the competition is coming from financial conglomerates that face the same issues. But if the playing field is also populated by aggressive insurance companies, broker-dealers, fund managers and other "monoline"
specialists, market discipline may be much more effective.
Conclusions
We have attempted to define reputational risk and to outline the sources of such risk facing financial services firms. It then considered the key drivers of reputational risk in the presence of transactions costs and imperfect information and surveyed available empirical research on the impact of reputational losses imposed on financial intermediaries. We then developed the link between reputational risk and exploitation of conflicts of interest, arguably one of the most important threats to the reputational capital of a financial intermediary. Finally, we considered managerial requisites for dealing with both reputational risk and conflicts of interest.
We conclude that market discipline, through the reputation-effects on the franchise value of financial intermediaries, can be a powerful complement to regulation and civil litigation. Nevertheless, market discipline-based controls remain controversial.
Financial firms continue to encounter serious instances of reputation loss due to misconduct despite its effects on the value of their franchises. This suggests material lapses in the governance process.
Dealing with reputational risk and controlling exploitation of conflicts of interest can be an expensive business, with compliance systems that are costly to maintain and various types of walls between business units and functions that impose significant opportunity costs due to inefficient use of information within the organization. Moreover, management of certain kinds of conflicts in multifunctional financial firms may be sufficiently difficult to require structural remediation. On the other hand, reputation losses associated with conflict of interest exploitation can cause serious damage -as demonstrated by reputation-sensitive "accidents" that seem to occur repeatedly in the financial services industry. Indeed, it can be argued that such issues contribute to market valuations among financial conglomerates that fall below valuations of more specialized financial services businesses. (Laeven & Levine, 2005; Schmid & Walter, 2006) .
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Managements and boards of financial intermediaries must be convinced that a good defense is as important as a good offense in determining sustainable competitive performance. This is something that is extraordinarily difficult to put into practice in a highly competitive environment for both financial services and for the highly skilled professionals that comprise the industry. It seems to require an unusual degree of senior management leadership and commitment. (Smith & Walter, 1997) 
